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Abstract
This paper provides a simple theoretical model designed to capture the targeting incentives
created by benchmark testing. Under high-stakes benchmark testing, schools and teachers are
judged on the fraction of students that meet some given level of educational attainment. The
incentive for teachers is then to allocate their resources towards students who are on the
margin of the pass/fail level of educational attainment. This behavior has some empirical
support and the aim of the model is to provide a formal means of developing hypotheses for
future research.
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The debate over public school performance has largely focused on incorporating account-
ability, best observed in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) with standardized
testing. As part of the act, schools must demonstrate prociency in select subject areas, and
those who are decient must prove to be making progress on an annual basis. The bench-
mark for these assessments are made based on the fraction of the school's students who pass
some minimum level of prociency on their respective annual standardized tests. Failure to
have the minimum proportion of students attain the procient level can result in withheld
federal funds. The focus on passing a specic fraction of students provides incentives for
schools and, by extension, their teachers to focus resources more heavily on the distribution
of student achievement gains. In order to maximize the number of students that pass the
prociency test, the optimal strategy would focus on directing attention away from students
whose outcomes are less dependent on the teacher's attention. High-aptitude students that
can pass the test with little input from the teacher, and likewise the low-aptitude students
who would not likely pass the test even with a great deal of attention from the teacher
would be the best choices for teacher neglect under this incentive scheme created by these
high-stakes prociency testing. The purpose of this paper is to provide a baseline theoretical
model to complement and motivate future empirical research on this behavior, as well as
serve as a starting point for more complete models of the education system.
This targeting behavior under high-stakes testing has been gaining empirical support
as well as national attention. TIME Magazine recently ran a cover story about the unin-
tended detrimental consequences NCLB has had on the brightest students (Cloud, 2007).
Jacob (2002) found evidence that teachers substituted away from untested or low-stakes
subject matter to the high-stakes subjects their performance was judged on. Additionally,
schools began retaining students earlier in their school career as a means of improving the
share that pass the exam. At the school level, Jacob (2002) found an increase in special
placements who typically are not included in the testable student body.
Wilson et al. (2004) conducted interviews with 22 English headmasters about the
changes their school have made in response to high-stakes testing. Eight of these headteachers
indicated they have strategies to target students whose grades are at the C/D borderline in
order to raise their schools' respective ranking, while two others said they had attempted
such strategies in the past but found them ineective. Burgess et al. (2005) found that,
with the implementation of high-stakes testing in the United Kingdom, educational gains
for low-ability students declined when their schools experienced increases in the number of
students who were near the pass/fail margin.
Using student-level panel data from the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills, Reback
(2006) found evidence of schools redistributing resources to focus on those borderline pass/fail
students. Reback used a two-stage probability model based on the probability of the student
achieving a passing grade and the probability this student contributed to improving the
school's rating. Reback found that students who were likely to contribute to a school's
rating, were more likely to make higher than expected gains in their test performance in
the following year. These students tended to be the lower-performing students, as the high
ability students tended to perform according to expectations.
The following section will provide a preliminary theoretical model with simple as-
1sumptions to explain some of these existing empirical results.
2 The Model
The assumed institutional structure is the common end-of-the-year prociency test. A school
receives approximately nine-months with students, at the end of which a prociency exam is
given where each student who passes a predetermined benchmark score according to his or
her grade level is considered to have \passed" the exam. The objective of the school then is to
maximize the percentage of students who achieve a passing score. Since enrollment at public
schools is taken as a given, this objective is equivalent to maximizing the number of students
who pass the exam. The targeting behavior to be modeled is observed at the teacher level,
who can discriminate their teaching eorts among the dierent students in their classroom.
An exogenously given number of students with varying levels of aptitude are assigned to
the teacher. Aptitude, a, is dened as a composite of the students' abilities, willingness to
learn, parental support, prior knowledge, and any other factors that may create heterogeneity
among the students to absorb the teacher's instruction and improve their ability to pass a
prociency test. It is assumed that teachers are able to perfectly observe their students'
aptitudes and rank them in order from lowest to highest over the range [p;q]. As a result of
this ranking, students can be uniquely identied according to their aptitude.
The teacher's tools for improving the educational attainment of each student is to
provide them with instructional attention, which can be divided into lecturing to the class
or providing individual attention to a student. The major dierence is that lecture (L) is
consumed as a pure-public good by the students while individual attention (t(a)) is purely
private. Students are assumed to experience diminishing marginal returns to their education
in both of these inputs. Brown and Saks (1975; 1980) used the same set of assumptions when
modeling a teacher's choice, with a semantic dierence in describing individual attention
as private tutoring. Similarly, Guest (2001) and Epstein and Spiegel (1996) use a similar
modeling of a university instructor's resources with lecture as a public good and oce hours
as a private good. Note that by dening individual attention as a pure private good, the
possibility of peer eects is eliminated. The teacher is assumed not to value his or her lecture
time any dierently from time spent on individual attention, so that the budget constraint
may be specied as




Where T is total time the teacher has for instruction.
The students' educational attainment can be dened as a function of their aptitude,
the amount of time the teacher lectures, and the amount of individual attention they receive.
As mentioned previously, students have diminishing returns to both inputs. A teacher will
receive some positive and nite level of utility (j) for bringing a student to a passable
level. The teacher is assumed to have perfect information about the students' educational
attainment relative to the benchmark standard they need to have in order to pass the exam.
The teacher will receive zero utility (V ) from a student who does not pass the benchmark
standard. Letting e() be the education function of the students and  e be the benchmark








j if e(L;t(a);a)   e
0 else
where 1 > j > 0 and f(a) is the distribution of the students according to aptitude level in
the classroom.
For simplicity a uniform distribution is assumed so that f(a) can be ignored. The
teacher simultaneously determines the total amount of lecture and the distribution of in-
dividual time to each student. While the decision is simultaneous, it can be thought of
occurring in two stages. In the rst stage the teacher chooses how much time to spend
lecturing, and in the second stage they choose how to allocate individual time with dier-
ent students. To solve I begin with the second stage, where the distribution of individual
attention is conditional on the amount of lecture performed in the rst stage. Letting ^ e()
represent the dierence function between the benchmark level and the educational attain-
ment with only lecture, it implicitly denes the optimal allocation of individual attention
among the students of dierent aptitudes (^ t(a)):
 e   e(L;0;a) = ^ e(L;^ t(a);a): (2)
Since the teacher will only be able to increase utility by moving students from failing
the benchmark standard to passing, equation (2) is only relevant to a subgroup of students.
This subgroup will be dened according to aptitude ranges [a; a], where  a is the lowest apti-
tude student who can pass the benchmark with only the lecture input the teacher performed
in the rst stage and a being the lowest aptitude student to have received individual attention
and pass the test. For additional clarity, Figure 1 illustrates this intuition for a given level of
lecture. The process can be thought of as a teacher having already lectured for L amount of
time, and begins providing individual attention to the student with the highest aptitude who
fails the exam with only lecture (just below  a) until their educational attainment reaches  e.
Once this is achieved, they move on to the next lowest aptitude student and provide them
with individual attention until they can reach a passable level. This process repeats until
they exhaust their total available time at student of aptitude a. In this context, the problem
of maximizing the number of students who can pass the benchmark level is equivalent to
minimizing the position of a (i.e. moving a as close to p as possible).
As already stated, equation (2) denes ^ t(a) between  a and a while being equal to
zero outside this range. It implicitly denes ^ t as a function of lecture, aptitude, and the
benchmark educational attainment of  e. Since we have lecture and total time given, both
 a and a are known and also become functions of lecture. In the general form,  a can be
implicitly dened from the following:
 e = e(L;0; a(L)) (3)
3By totally dierentiating Equation (3) with respect to L, it can be seen that  a0(L)
will be strictly negative:









This demonstrates that the more the teacher lectures, the more students will pass
with only lecture. This however does not necessarily mean that it will maximize the total
number of students who pass the exam, as there are diminishing returns for all students
to lecture and that individual attention time is sacriced. Again, the best strategy for the
teacher is to begin with the student of the highest aptitude that will fail the test with only
lecture. After prescribing the minimal amount of individual attention necessary to get that
student to  e, the teacher will then begin with the student of the next highest ability that
is still failing the test and repeat the process until they run out of time. As a result of this
process, the following equality must hold:
Z  a(L)
a(L)
^ t(L;a;  e)da = T   L (4)
From this equality, a(L) can be solved for and dierentiated. The position of a, the
lowest aptitude student to receive individual attention and pass benchmark  e, is expected
to be a convex function of lecture. A teacher who lectures too little will begin providing
individual attention at too high of level of  a, and a teacher who provides too much lecture
will not have enough time left over to provide individual attention to reach the minimum
possible a student. Using Leibniz Integral Rule, equation (4) can be dierentiated with
respect to L as: Z  a(L)
a(L)
@^ t(L;a;  e)
@L







Notice now that ^ tj a= 0 because they are the lowest aptitude students to pass the test
with only lecture, and hence do not receive individual attention. Substituting this into the









@L da + 1
^ tja
(6)
Setting this equation equal to zero yields the a minimizing level of lecture, which in




@^ t(L;a;  e)
@L
da = 1 (7)
Since the budget constraint mandates an inverse relationship between ^ t and L, the
partial derivative @^ t=@L is negative and so is its integration over [a; a]. Graphically, the
negative of this integral represents the diminished vertical distance in ^ t from an increase
in lecture and intuitively it represents the marginal benet of increasing lecture. Increasing
4lecture increases the number of students between [ a;q] and it reduces the amount of individual
attention required for students between [a; a] to reach the benchmark level. This is set against
its marginal cost, which is just one unit of time.
It can be seen from equation (7) that increasing  e, the only policy variable in this
model, will result in the aptitude range [a; a] covering a range of higher aptitude students
who oer higher returns to lecture. Holding L xed then would leave the marginal benet
greater than marginal cost, suggesting that an increase in the benchmark level will increase
the amount of lecture the teacher performs.
It is dicult to conrm at this point that the function a is convex using calculus. It
is likely that at low levels of lecture there are still high returns and a will be a student of
relatively high aptitude. By increasing the lecture, the position of a will move to the left at
the expense of reduced individual attention. Conversely, lecturing too much will result in
too few students receiving enough individual attention to achieve  e, and a will begin moving
to the right.
A couple of interesting features emerge from studying this model and provide some
testable hypotheses for empirical researchers. One is that structural break in educational
attainment that occurs around the middle aptitude students. Another comes from observing
that neither p nor q enter into the teacher's optimization problem at any point. This implies
that adding another student to the classroom whose aptitude is greater than  a or lower than
a will not change the allocation of time, but only inuence the resulting pass-fail rate.
Also interesting is considering what will occur if the benchmark level ( e) is raised.
Holding, lecture constant,  a would move to the right and the teachers would begin taking
attention away from the students closer to a and redistribute it to the higher aptitude
students. Unambiguously this lowers the pass rate for the teacher, but it has this interesting
eect on the distribution of educational gains within the system, particularly it should mean
greater educational gains for the higher-aptitude students.
3 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to provide a theoretical model to support previous
empirical ndings and motivate future research on the distribution of educational attainment
among students. The distinct feature of the model is the incentive of teachers to divert
attention away from the highest and lowest aptitude students to those towards the middle
near the benchmark level of educational attainment. The formalization of this behavior in
the model allows for several empirically testable hypotheses in addition to this targeting
behavior.
The model also seems to predict that if this targeting behavior is occurring, then
adding a new student with very high- or low-aptitude will not have an impact on the dis-
tribution of students' educational attainment. If instead we add a mid-level student who is
close enough to the pass/fail margin, then we will see a change in those achievement distri-
butions. If researchers obtain data that contains observations of students who transfer to
dierent schools, they may be able to study this eect.
This model serves as a starting point as it has many simplied assumptions. At-
tempting a dierent production function, providing alternative non-teaching uses of time,
5and incorporating peer eects are all possible extensions for the model. This would also
be useful in developing a holistic model of the education system, as it could serve as a
counterpart to a model that formalizes the incentives of administrators determining class
composition and size, as well as parents choosing school districts with students of high or
low aptitude dominating the student body.
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6Figure 1: Theoretical Allocation of Individual Attention with Benchmark Testing.
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